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CASES NOTED
THE JOINDER-SEVERABILITY QUESTION SURROUNDING
LIABILITY INSURER DEFENDANTS
A minor sued Beta Eta House and its liability insurance carrier
to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negli-
gence of the fraternity house in maintaining its premises. The insurance
carrier, which had been joined as a party defendant, moved for dismissal.
Although the motion to dismiss was denied, as was the carrier's petition
for common law writ of certiorari in the district court of appeal, two
questions were certified for review by the Florida Supreme Court' which
held: The principles announced in Skingleton v. Bussey2 are applicable
to all forms of liability insurance, but the trial court may on a motion
of either party order separate trials3 in those cases where a liability
insurer is joined as a defendant. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237
So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
Apparently, there are three prevalent theories regarding the dis-
closure of insurance coverage in the jury trial.4 The so-called "older
line of authority" follows the position that any evidence of the defendant's
insurance should be kept from the jury.5 Until recently, this has been
the Florida position.6 A second viewpoint is that the mere mention of
insurance, in the absence of anything more (e.g., dwelling on it, featur-
ing it, or making an issue of it) is not prejudicial. 7 The third and ap-
parently more modern view, is that there should be full disclosure of
insurance coverage and that such disclosure is harmless in terms of
prejudicing a jury.8
As a corollary to the theories regarding the role of insurance, there
are basically three schools of thought regarding the joinder of insurance
carriers.9 The first, and probably oldest school of thought, simply holds
1. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
2. 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969). The Court in this case announced that an insurer could be
joined as a defendant, and the issue of insurance coverage could be brought to the jury's
attention.
3. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b).
4. For a more detailed discussion of the earlier history regarding these theories, see
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949).
5. See Hoffman v. Brandt, 65 Cal. 2d 549, 421 P.2d 425, 55 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966);
Brandemarte v. Green, 37 N.J. 557, 182 A.2d 562 (1962).
6. See Rose v. Peters, 82 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1955) ; Cars Markets v. Meyer, 69 So.2d 789
(Fla. 1953) ; Carlton v. Johns, 194 So.2d 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967) ; Crowell v. Fink, 135 So.2d
766 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961) ; Barnett v. Butler, 112 So.2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
7. See Schevling v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 87 (D. Conn. 1953) ; Clark v. Atlantic Steve-
doring Co., 3 F.R.D. 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413 (D. Md. 1939);
Odegard v. Connolly, 211 Minn. 342, 1 N.W.2d 137 (1941).
8. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See also Note, The Liability Insurer
As A Real Party In Interest, 41 MINN. L. REv. 784 (1957); Note, Permissive Joinder As A
Substitute For Excluding Evidence That Defendant Is Insured, 59 YALE L.J. 1160 (1950).
9. For a detailed description of the earlier law regarding direct action and joinder, see 8
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4861-66 (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter referred to as
APPLEmAN]. See also Note, Procedure-Insurance Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla.
1969), 48 TExAs L. REv. 242 (1969).
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that insurers should not be joined as defendants in suits by injured
parties against insureds."° This doctrine has been followed until recently
in Florida," based on the rationale that the suit between the insured and
the injured party was one in tort, whereas the relationship between the
insured and insurer was a contractual one. 2 The second school embraces
the theory that only under certain circumstances may there be joinder
of the insurer. Under this theory, there are two tests employed by the
various states to determine whether joinder will be allowed. According
to the first test, if the insurance policy is construed to be liability in-
insurance, as opposed to indemnity insurance," the insurer may be
joined, but not otherwise. 4 The other test employed is that the insurer
may be joined where the insurance involved is required by statute, or
pursuant to a license that is required by statute. 5 The third school al-
lows joinder of insurers either because of a statute, 6 or through case
law,'" without some of the reservations of the other theories, but it does
restrict joinder in other ways. For instance, Wisconsin, whose statute
is generally considered the forerunner of the "direct action" statutes, has
numerous cases holding the statute to be very narrowly construed and
that it only applies to motor vehicles on streets and highways. 8
Returning now to a discussion of the instant case, Beta Eta House
Corp. v. Gregory,'9 the Supreme Court of Florida appears to have given
the "right" 20 of direct action a much broader scope than most jurisdic-
10. See Shermoen v. Lindsay, 163 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1968); Young v. Barney, 20 Utah
2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967).
11. See Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
12. See Jones v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 19 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Fla. 1937);
Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936); Thompson v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, 199 So.2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967); Fincher Motor Sales Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So.2d
672 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
13. Theoretically, liability insurance makes the insurer primarily liable, whereas in-
demnity insurance makes the insurer only secondarily liable.
14. See Wells v. American Employers Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942); Jones v.
Thunderbird Transp. Co., 178 F. Supp. 9 (D.C. Kan. 1959); Kuntz v. Spence, 67 S.W.2d 254
(Tex. Ct. App. 1934).
15. See John Long Trucking Inc. v. Greear, 421 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1970); Har-Pen
Truck Lines Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967); Spicer v. American Home Assurance
Co., 292 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Ga. 1967); James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 43 N.W.2d 692 (1950);
Meyer v. Guernsey, 111 Neb. 577, 197 N.W. 432 (1924). See also APPLEMAN, supra note 9,
at § 4862 (1962).
16. There are four jurisdictions that have "direct action" statutes, which permit the
injured party to join the insurer. They are as follows: Guam-GUAm Gov'T CODE § 43,354
(1961); Puerto Rico-26 P.R. LAWs ANN. § 2001 (1958) & § 2003 (1968); Louisiana-LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1969); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 204.30(4), 260.11(1)
(1969).
17. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969). Florida is the only state at the
present time that has adopted direct action by judicial rather than legislative process. See
Note, Procedure-Insurance, Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969), 48 TEXAs L.
REV. 242 (1969).
18. See APPLEMAN, supra note 9, at § 4866.
19. 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
20. This "right" was considered, by the first district court of appeal to be procedural.
However, many courts have considered the right to sue the insurer a substantive matter. See,
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tions which permit such a suit.2' The district court pointed out that
although the decision by the district court in Shingleton was narrow,22
the Supreme Court in Shingleton made it clear that the holding applied
not only to automobile liability insurance but to other types of insurance
as well. 2' This view was evidently adopted by the Florida Supreme Court
when it answered the certified questions in Beta Eta, for the court chose
to utilize those arguments put forth in their earlier Shingleton opinion
which could easily be applied to other types of insurance as well. 24 One
such argument is that today, "it is very likely that the jury will assume,
rightly or wrongly, that the defendant is insured. 25
In expanding the holding of Shingleton, the court in Beta Eta may
have been aware that other courts in Florida were reading Shingleton
as applying to more than just automobiles.2 Although in the instant case
two members of the court dissented from the majority,27 both the majority
and the dissent appear to have agreed that the peculiarities relating to
automobiles in Florida 28 were not sufficient to prevent Shingleton from
applying to all types of liability insurance.
Although the clarification of Shingleton's applicability to nonauto-
mobile policies was helpful, the real significance of Beta Eta was its
affirmance of the district court's opinion on separate trials. The court
noted, with emphasis, that the word "should," in the lower court's opin-
ion,29 was changed to "may."3 0 However, at least to one dissenting justice,
e.g., Swanson v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. 111. 1967); Greear v. John
Long Trucking Inc., 272 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Okla. 1967); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran &
Co., 251 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1966); Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d
622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965). But see Noe v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666
(Mo. 1966) and Penny v. Powell, 162 Tex. 497, 347 S.W.2d 601 (1961) which held the right
of direct action to be one of procedure. See also Comment, The Louisiana Direct Action
Statute, 22 LA. L. REV. 243, 252 (1961).
21. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
22. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So.2d 593 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
23. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969). For a detailed analysis of the
Shingleton decision, see Note, Joinder of the Liability Insurer As A Party Defendant, 23 U.
M Axi L. REV. 652 (1969). See also Note, Procedure-Insurance Shingleton v. Bussey, 223
So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969), 48 TExAs L. REV. 242 (1969).
24. In Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713, 718, the court pointed out that joinder of the
insurer would decrease the number of suits and the "[a]boveboard revelation of the interest
of an insurer in the outcome of the recovery action against insured should be more beneficial
to insurers. . . 2" Id.
25. Note, The Liability Insurer As A Real Party In Interest, 41 MINN. L. REV. 784, 789
(1957). See also Kalven, The Jury, The Law, and The Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
Orno ST. L.J. 158 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kalven].
26. See Duran v. McPherson, 233 So.2d 639 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (applying Shingleton
to professional liability insurance); Shipman v. Kinderman, 232 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1970) (applying Shingleton to medical malpractice insurance); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 231 So.2d 235 (Fla. 3d. Dist. 1970) (applying Shingleton to homeowners liability
insurance).
27. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d at 166.
28. See Financial Responsibility Law, FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1969).
29. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So.2d 495, 500 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
30. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
this appears to be a distinction without a difference for even the majority
admits that separation will be the rule as opposed to the exception."
It appears that the majority, in reaching their decision, reasoned
that the purpose of joining the insurer was for judgment only, thus the
substantive law prohibiting the issue of insurance from reaching the
jury could be maintained, while at the same time having the insurer in
the litigation as a defendant though not a party to the initial trial. 2
Although the court in Beta Eta, apparently tried to complement the
Shingleton decision, there are many who believe that the effect of
the decision is for all practical purposes to reverse Shingleton33
Since the supreme court affirmed the lower court's interpretation
that the action in Shingleton involved only a procedural matter, the bene-
fits of Shingleton may now be realized, i.e., having the insurer joined
to avoid garnishment proceedings, etc., without disturbing the substan-
tive long-standing rule against disclosure of insurance to the jury. 4
However, several members of the supreme court indicated in the Beta
Eta opinion that Shingleton did in fact involve a decision on the sub-
stantive question of insurance.35 In fact, much of the language in Shingle-
ton appears to give this impression. 6
A valid argument has been made for keeping knowledge of insurance
from the jury. For one thing, studies show that knowledge of insurance
may affect the jury, both on the question of liability as well as damages.
3 7
In addition, if the jury can know of the defendant's insurance resources,
then why shouldn't they be apprised of the defendant's personal financial
resources?"
Good arguments though they may be, this author is hard-pressed
to find any reliance on these statements by the court in Shingleton. In
fact, the following language from the Shingleton case seems to relate to
the substantive issue of disclosure rather than to the procedural question
of joinder: "the injection of insurance does not operate to increase the
31. Id. at 166 (Boyd, dissenting opinion).
32. This reasoning was expressed in a companion case decided at the same time, wherein
Shingleton was extended to cover medical malpractice insurance. See Brief for Petitioner at 8,
9, North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Roach, 237 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1970).
33. See Brief for Respondent at 20, 230 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st. Dist. 1970); Brief for
Respondent at 5, North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Roach, 237 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1970) ; Beta
Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970) at 5 (Boyd, dissenting opinion), at 8
(Ervin, dissenting opinion).
34. But see Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d at 166 (Boyd, dissenting
opinion).
35. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d at 165.
36. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d at 718.
37. See Kalven, supra note 25; Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University
of Chicago Law School, 24 INs. COUNSEL J. 368 (1957).
38. For a discussion on this argument and the law pertaining thereto, see Brief for
Petitioner at 10, North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Roach, 237 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1970) ; Brief
for Petitioner at 6, Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So.2d 495 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970).
See also 22 AM. JuR. 2d, Damages § 320 (1965).
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size of jury verdicts"; 9 "we do think the stage has now been reached
where juries are more mature."40 This author is forced to conclude
that when the court in Shingleton spoke of a "candid admission at trial
of the existence of insurance coverage,"41 as opposed to "the questionable
'ostrich in the sand' approach,"4 2 it was dealing with the substantive
question of whether or not insurance coverage is a subject for the jury's
knowledge. Accordingly, the court has been inconsistent in its rulings
in Shingleton and Beta Eta.
It is this author's opinion, that regardless of the intent of the court
in Beta Eta, the effect of its decision will be, for all practical purposes,
to override Shingleton. It is unfortunate that the State of Florida ap-
parently will return "to the present rule of non-disclosure--a rule which
is not only a fruitful source of controversy, but fails completely to ac-
complish its purpose."4 3
STEPHEN T. BROWN
STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUIT: PLAINTIFFS'
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiffs, stockholders of a closed-end mutual fund, brought a
derivative action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York, naming as defendants the corporation's board of directors
and an investment banking firm which acted as the corporation's stock
broker.' Both the directors and the broker were accused of breaching the
fiduciary duty owed by each to the corporate fund. The broker, some of
whose partners comprised a portion of the corporation's board of directors,
was also alleged to have thereby violated the Investment Company Act
of 1940.2 This control by the broker was alleged to have been used for
the purpose of extracting from the corporation unusually high brokerage
fees. Allegations against the directors individually, asserted that they had
converted corporate assets and were guilty of "gross abuse of trust,
gross misconduct, willful misfeasance, bad faith," and "gross negligence."
The plaintiffs' complaint requested an accounting of the alleged excess
profits received by the broker and of the resulting losses to the corpora-
tion and also demanded a jury trial. The defendant's motion to strike




43. Note, Permissive Joinder As A Substitute for Excluding Evidence that Defendant is
Insured, 59 YALE: L.J. 1160, 1167 (1950).
1. Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) 1 et seq. (1964).
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